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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


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(G.V.N.) Programs, including as much of the Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP), as can be agreed by both governments, already underway in South Vietnam. There is neither the time available nor any sound justification for "starting from scratch." Rather the need is to focus the U.S. effort in South Vietnam on the immediate internal security problem; to infuse it with a sense of urgency and a dedication to the overall U. S. objective; to achieve, through cooperative inter-departmental support both in the field and in Washington, the operational flexibility needed to apply the available U.S. assets in a manner best calculated to achieve our objective in Vietnam; to give the U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. team under his leadership general authority to undertake a series of accelerated measures as noted below; and finally, to impress on our friends, the Vietnamese, and on our foes, the Communists, that come what may, the U.S. intends to win this battle.

Program of Action:

1. General: The situation in South Vietnam has reached the point where, at least for the time being, primary emphasis must be placed on providing a solution to the internal security problem. A significant step which has already been taken by the Country Team, to counter Communist subversion in South Vietnam has been the development of the Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP). Those portions

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