Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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at the expense of countering the insurgency. Last spring, following the Vice-President's promise of more aid, proposals for increased and reform taxes which were well advanced were promptly dropped. The parallel on administrative political reform could be close.
20. It will be said that we need troops for a show of strength and determination in the area. Since the troops will not deal with fundamental faults -- since there can't be enough of them to give security to the countryside -- their failure to provide security could create a worse crisis of confidence. You will be aware of my general reluctance to move in troops. On the other hand I would note that it is those of us who have worked in the political vineyard and who have committed our hearts most strongly to the political fortunes of the New Frontier who worry most about its bright promise being sunk under the rice fields. Dulles in 1954 saw the dangers in this area. Dean Acheson knew he could not invest men in Chiang.
21. We should press forward on the diplomatic front to get all possible international support for our position and to raise the barrier to more overt Hanoi intervention as high as possible. This was always a long shot. As the result of my trip I think it a longer one. That is because the actual material support is smaller than our propaganda has persuaded us to believe and I don't suppose we can stop the moral support and leadership which the insurrection receives. However we should make all effort.
22. In this connection, in addition to the other moves at Geneva, on the ICC and through the Indians to Hanoi as discussed we should ask our NATO ally the Canadians and our SEATO ally the Australians to make clear to
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