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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
5 May 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Subject: 5 May 1961 Meeting at state
Secretary of state Rusk posed the question of the introduction of US forces into Vietnam prior to the beginning of the Geneva Conference. A discussion ensued between Secretary Rusk, Secretary Gilpatric, Mr. Steeves, Ambassadors Johnson, Young and others present. The following points were dominant:
- - Should we place combat troops in South Vietnam - if so, should it be prior to 12 May?
- - The size of the forces and the mission or objectives.
- - North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Accords - and the extent of proof the US can provide.
- - UK's expressed caution against any military buildup in Vietnam prior to the Geneva Conference and during its early phase.
- - US privilege to make counter moves at least to the extent of the North Vietnam violations.
- - Augmentation of the MAAG and to what extent.
Secretary Rusk decided that:
- a. We should not place combat forces in South Vietnam at this time.
- b. We should proceed to augment the MAAG, in small incrementsm with up to 100 additional military personnel and not discuss it with the UK of ICC. He recommended that these personnel be placed in varied locations to avoid attention.
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