Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
for military action in Indochina" and the "current numerical advantage of the French Union forces over the enemy, i.e., approximately 5 to 3." Pointing out the disadvantages of either stationing large numbers of U.S. troops in Indochina or of basing U.S. aircraft on Indochina's limited facilities, the Chiefs considered "the current greatest need" to be an expanded, intensified training program for indigenous troops. The JCS observed, moreover, that they were guided in their comments by the likely reaction of the CPR to U.S. involvement, as well as by the prescription: "Atomic weapons will be used whenever it is to our military advantage."
- d. JCS Urge Limited U.S. Commitment
In view of these problems and prospects, the JCS urged the limitation of U.S. involvement to strategic planning and the training of indigenous forces through an increase in MAAG to 2250 men. Our force commitment should be limited, they thought, primarily to air-naval support directed from outside Indochina; even here, the Chiefs cautioned against making a "substantial" air force commitment. The Chiefs were also mindful of the Chinese. Since Viet Minh supplies came mainly from China, "the destruction or neutralization of those outside sources supporting the Viet Minh would materially reduce the French military problems in Indochina." The Chiefs were clearly taking the position that any major U.S. force commitment in the Far East should be reserved for a war against the Chinese. Recognizing the limitations of the U.S. defense establishment for large-scale involvement in so-called "brush-fire" wars, the Chiefs were extremely hesitant as had consistently been the case, to favor action along the periphery of China when the strategic advantages of U.S. power lay in decisive blows against the major enemy. Thus, the JCS closed their memorandum with the admonition that air-naval commitments beyond those specified
- "...will involve maldeployment of forces and reduce readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the Far East. From the point of view of the United States, with reference to the Far East as a whole, Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and the allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces to that area would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities."13
- e. JCS Call for Meeting of Interested Western Powers
The JCS evidently also decided that it would be a good idea to gather together military representatives of the U.S., France, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. At first, the Chiefs suggested the downgrading of the representatives to below chief-of-staff level; but apparently on the strong protest of Under Secretary Smith at Geneva,14 and of the British too,15 the Chiefs acquiesced in a meeting at chief-of-staff level. But prior to the meeting, which began the first week of June, important developments occurred in the U.S.–France go-'round on intervention.
