Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
preparing for war; therefore, we should firmly hold aloft the banner of peace and enhance our vigilance." :1.54/
The text of this statement reported by U.S. intelligence at the time, however, had Ho coupling his statement that "the enemies of our people . still occupy one half of our national territory and are preparing for war … " with the ominous assertion that the DRV must "be in a position to change the form of the struggle . .. " Moreover, Truong Chinh, the Party First Secretary, was reported to have addressed the notion that "peaceful unification" of Vietnam might be "illusory and reformist." 155/
In May the Soviet Co-chairman of the Geneva Conferenc e signed the letter calling upon the two Vietnams to observe the Accords, but in effect committing the Geneva powers and ICC to status quo in Vietnam. At this juncture, the DRV appeared resigned to partition for the foreseeable future, as evidenced in the public letter of 19 June 1956 from Ho Chi Minh to the restive regroupees, in which he undertook to explain and defend a "s ocialism in one country" strategy (see supra, p. 24), but stressed that "the present political struggle is a stage in our national democratic revolution . . . in the present political struggle, as in the Revolution and the Resistance, our compatriots in the South are in the vanguard, closely united and struggling herOically and perseveringly." 156/ As the deadlines for the Geneva Elections (July) 1956) approached, NVA troops were dravm back from the Demilitarized Zone in Vietnam to defensive positions; DRV diplomats wooed the neutral nations in search of support, openly advocating neutralization of Southeast Asia: Captured orders to Party cadre in South Vietnam stressed "an ideology of lying 101" for a long time …" 157/
The Geneva deadline passed uneventfully, the DRV by July being well impressed with the futility of looking to the Conference for aid. Ho's Pravda article of 2 August 1956 underscored the DRV's rejection of a go-it-alone strategy, and its continued fealty to the Bloc led by the Soviets. 158/
2. Internal Dissent and Reassessment: Summer 1956 -- Fall, 1957·
By mid-1956, the Lao Dong Party leaders faced at home not only a crisis of confidence over their foreign policy failure, but
the serious threat to internal security arising from reaction to the Land Reform Campaign. To stem deterioration of public morale, Ho announced on 18 August 1956 the "successful completion" of Land Reform, admitting to "errors" by the Party, and closing his statement with an appeal for unity under the Fatherland Front:
