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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


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with him, (copy by pouch) I discussed growing criticism of his brother and Madam Nhu, as well as Dr. Tuyen and suggested that they should be assigned abroad. Diem did not interrupt me but assumed somewhat grim, and I detected, slightly hurt manner. His only comment was that these rumors about the Nhus were spread by communists. I replied that I was sure that communists were doing all they could to spread such rumors but I repeated that the unfortunate part about it is that more and more people are believing these reports - Vietnamese loyal to him, those who might be considered in the opposition, foreign civilians and foreign diplomats to say nothing of the press. I repeated, as I had previously, these reports were seriously damaging prestige of his regime.

"After discussing the Nhus, I again apologized, first of all for bringing up this personal and sensitive subject, as well as the other suggestions I had made. I again asked his indulgence and forgiveness for speaking so frankly and added I hoped he would understand that I was talking as a sincere friend." (Saigon 802 to SecState, 15 October 1960, corrected copy)

The same day, September 16, 1960, as the Ambassador's recommendations for a political demarche to Diem, the JCS informed CINCPAC and the Chief of MAAG that they and the Deputy SecDef had approved a CINCPAC draft plan for counterinsurgency operations by the Government of South Vietnam. This had its origins in CINCPAC's staff study of April 26, 1960, subsequently endorsed by the JCS on June 6, 1960, with the recommendations:

"a. That appropriate U.S. Government Departments and agencies encourage the Vietnamese and Laotian Governments to adopt a national emergency organization to integrate civil and military resources under centralized direction for the conduct of counter-insurgency operations.

"b. That these U.S . departments and agencies encourage the Vietnamese and Laotian Governments to develop coordinated national plans for the progressive reduction of Communist influence.

"c. That these U.S. Government departments and agencies be authorized and directed to support the training for and conduct of emergency operations … "

"e. That the U.S . Government provide sufficient materiel and budgetary support to insure the successful accomplishment of these emergency campaigns.

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