Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
but programmed to become Chief, MAAG, Vietnam, in September 1960 "General McGarr was informed by this study, and by his other preparations for his new assignment, of the increasing concern in Washington about the military situation in Vietnam.
On 24 March 1960, the Chief of Staff of the Army had called for urgent measures to improve the counterguerrilla capabilities of RVNAF.[1] On 30 March 1960, the JCS advised CINCPAC (telegram JCS 974802, date cited) that:
"The JCS agree that anti-guerrilla capability should be developed within organization of the regular armed forces by changing emphasis in training selected elements ARVN and other forces from conventional to anti-guerrilla warfare."
On 27 April 1960, CINCPAC submitted a study on counterinsurgency in South Vietnam to the JCS. On 6 June, JCS forwarded this study to the Secretary of Defense, recommending his acting to obtain U.S. Government support of counterinsurgency operations.[2] The initial recommendation was followed by a proposed outline plan. The Secretary of Defense obtained the necessary concurrence in Washington, and on 20 October CINCPAC and Ambassador Durbrow were directed to develop the detailed plan and submit it to Washington (Joint State-DOD Message 192020Z October 1960).
In the meantime, Chief, MAAG, with the assistance of additional U.S. Army Special Forces, began in June a new training program for RVNAF designed to improve its counterguerrilla capabilities. Also, in September by SM-906-60 (15 September 1960), the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed subordinate commanders to take steps to improve guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare training. In early 1961, the Director of the Joint Staff, Lt. General Earle G. Wheeler (WSM-158-61, 9 February 1961) circulated a paper prepared by General McGarr to improve that training in Vietnam. The paper, entitled "Information, Guidance and Instructions to MAAG Advisory Personnel by Lt. General Lionel C. McGarr, November 10, 1960," called for the training of RVNAF to produce the "anti-guerrilla guerrilla." General McGarr pointed out that the guerrilla derived his principal strength from conventional, opponents, and that he had to be defeated in his own chosen form of combat:
"There is only one way he can survive--capitalize on the conventional concept by taking advantage of the inherent
- ↑ U. S. Army, Office Chief of Military History, "United States Policy Toward Vietnam Since 1945," Choronology.
- ↑ CINCPAC, Command History for 1960, 143-144.
