Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
| DATE | EVENT OR DOCUMENT | DESCRIPTION |
|
views were rejected in favor of Black's second paper which advocated more ARYN troops -- to counter overt aggression, not increased infiltration -- and commitment of US troops for training purposes -- not for political reassurance or demonstration of US resolve. Black's second paper was sent to the NSC.) | ||
| 29 Apr 1961 | Kennedy Decisions on the Draft Report | Kennedy did not act on the Laos Annex. He approved only the limited military proposals contained in the first Gilpatric Task Force report. The 685-man MAAG would be increased to 785 to enable it to train the approved 20,000 new ARVN troops. Kennedy also authorized the MAAG to support and advise the Self Defense Corps (40,000 men); authorized MAP support for the entire Civil Guard of 68,000 (vice 32,000 previously supported); ordered installation of radar surveillance equipment and okayed MAP support and training for the Vietnamese Junk Force. |
| 1 May 1961 | NSC Meets; New Draft of the Task Force Report Issued | Kennedy again deferred decision on sending troops into Laos apparently because the feeling that the US would not moke such a move was now firm.
The 1 May draft report was little different from the 28 April version. The Laos Annex was incorporated into the main paper; the US was to make known its readiness to "intervene unilaterally" in Southeast Asia to fulfill SEATO commitments (vice intervene in conjunction with SEATO forces). ARVN increases were now justified by the threat of overt aggression as well as increased infiltration. |
