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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
| DATE | EVENT OR DOCUMENT | DESCRIPTION |
| 6 May 1961 | Second State Re-Draft of the Task Force Report | Here, military actions were contained in an annex; the political section reflected less panic over the loss of Laos; deployment of US troops was less definite -- called something which "might result from an NSC decision following discussions between Vice President Johnson and President Diem." The matter is being studied, said the draft. The report said: Diem "is not now fully confident of US support," that it is "essential (his) full confidence in and communication with the United States be restored promptly." (Lansdale's recommendations of January, April, etc.) The report called for a "major alteration in the present government structure," "believed" a combination of inducements plus discreet pressures might work, but it was unenthusiastic both about Diem, and his chances of success. The Diem-is-the-only-available-leader syndrome is evident here. |
| 10 May 1961 | JCSM 320-61 | "Assuming the political decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside the communist sphere," the JCS emphatically recommended deployment of sufficient US forces to provide a visible deterrent to potential DRV/CHICOM action, release ARVN from static to active counterinsurgency operations, assist training and indicate US firmness. (In JCSM 311-61 of 9 May, the Chiefs recommended deployment of US forces to Thailand also.) |
| 11 May 1961 | NSAM 52 | Directed "full examination" by DOD of a study on the size and composition of forces which might comprise a possible commitment of troops to Southeast Asia. In effect, Kennedy "took note" of the study but made no decision on the issue of troop |
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TOP SECRET – Sensitive
