Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. B. 1.djvu/26

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET – Sensitive

DATE EVENT OR DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
11 Oct 1961 (Continued)

on Diem's effectiveness, which is very problematical, "favored going in with 7O–3O odds "but figured the odds would slide down if the U.S. "let, say, a month go by" before moving.

13 Oct 1961 Saigon Message 488 Reversing his previous position, Diem requested an additional fighter-bomber squadron, civilian pilots for helicopters and C-47 transports and U.S. combat units for a "combat-training" mission near the DMZ, possibly also in the highlands. He asked consideration be given a possible request for a division of Chiang Kai-shek's troops to support the GVN. Nolting recommended "serious and prompt" attention for the requests.
14 Oct 1961 New York Times In an article leaked by the government -- perhaps by Kennedy himself -- leaders were called reluctant to send U.S. combat units into Southeast Asia. Obviously untrue, the leak was probably designed to end speculation about troop deployment and guard Kennedy's freedom of action.
20 Oct 1961 CINCPAC Recommendation Admiral Felt felt the pros and cons of U.S. troop deployment added up in favor of no deployment until other means of helping Diem had been exhausted.
18–24 Oct 1961 Taylor Mission to Vietnam On the 18th, Diem said he wanted no U.S. combat troops for any mission. He repeated his request for a bilateral defense treaty, more support for ARVN and combat-support equipment (helicopters, aircraft, etc.).
23 Oct 1961 Ch MAAG Message General McGarr suggested that the serious Mekong River flood could provide a cover for U.S. troop deployment: combat units could be disguised as humanitarian relief forces and be dispatched to the delta.
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