NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive
- a. Is the security of Southeast Asia vital to the U.S. and of the free world?
- b. Are additional steps necessary?
- c. Will the additional steps accomplish their mission of stopping the intrusions of Hanoi and Peiping into the south?
- Whether approached from b or c above, it seems obvious that we must do everything within our power to stiffen and strengthen the situation in South Vietnam. We recognize that…the time sequence of Communist actions may force the critical decisions before any such preparatory measures could achieve tangible success.
II. Nevertheless, in Honolulu, we would like you…to be prepared to discuss with us several proposals…perhaps the most radical…is the one which…would involve a major infusion of U.S. efforts into a group of selected provinces where Vietnamese seem currently unable to execute their pacification programs…
We would therefore propose that U.S. personnel, both civilian and military, drawn from the U.S. establishment currently in Vietnam, be 'encadred' into current Vietnamese political and military structure…
Specifically, this would involve the assignment of civilian personnel, alternatively military personnel with a civilian function, to work in the provincial administration, and insofar as it is feasible, down to the logistic level of administration. On the military side it would mean the introduction of mobile training teams to train, stiffen and improve the state of the Vietnamese paramilitary forces and district operation planning…
In order to test the utility of such a proposal, we would suggest that seven provinces be chosen for this purpose. We would offer the provinces of Long An, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Tay Ninh, Hau Ngiah, which are five critical provinces in the immediate vicinity of Saigon. Additionally, we would propose Quang Ngia.… and finally Phu Yen.…
…U.S. personnel assigned to these functions would not appear directly in the chain of command.… They would instead be listed as "assistants" to the Vietnamese officials. In practice, however, we would expect them to carry a major share of the burden of decision and action…
