Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 1.djvu/130

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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centers of population, make plans for the conduct of operations and assure their efficient execution by military and police forces completely responsive to its authority. It must have the means to cope with the enemy reactions which must be expected to result from any change in the pattern of our operations.

I (the President) particularly request that you and your colleagues in the American Country Team develop and execute a concerted effort to bring home to all groups in South Vietnam the paramount importance of national unity against the Communist enemy at this critical time. It is a matter of the greatest difficulty for the U.S. government to require great sacrifice of American citizens when reports from Saigon reportedly give evidence of heedless self-interest and shortsightedness among nearly all major groups in South Vietnam…

While effectiveness is largely a subjective judgement, progress in certain specific areas such as those listed below provide some tangible measure. The U.S. mission should urge upon the GVN particular efforts in these fields.…

(1) Improve the use of manpower for military and pacification purposes.

(2) Bring the armed forces and police to authorized strength and maximize their effectiveness.

(3) Replace incompetent officials and commanders; freeze the competent in place for extended periods of service.

(4) Clarify and strengthen police powers of arrest, detention, and interrogation of VC suspects.

(5) Clarify and strengthen the authority of provincial chiefs.

(6) Make demonstrable progress in the HOP TAC operation around Saigon.

(7) Broaden and intensify the civic action program using both military and civilian resources to produce tangible evidence of the desire of the government to help the hamlets and villages.

(8) Carry out a sanitary clean up of Saigon.

While progress was being made toward these goals, the U.S. would be willing to strike harder at infiltration routes in Laos and at sea and, in conjunction with the Lao Government, add U.S. air power to operations to

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