Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 1.djvu/137

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive

14. Get Australian/New Zealand agreement to take responsibility for establishing regional forces training center. (Ask State to try.)

15. Integrated U.S/GVN psychological warfare operations organization. (USIA job, - DOD will help.)

16. Accelerate positioning of remaining sub-sector advisory teams. (OK - ask Max his requirements.)

17. Provide cash contingency fund to each sub-sector advisory group. (OK - ask Max for his plan.)

18. Establish procedure for sub-sector advisory groups to draw on USOM food stuffs and building materials. (OK - ask Max for his plan.)

19. Initiate dredging projects at Danang, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang. (OK - ask Max for his requirements.)

20. Provide 4 LSTs and 6 LSVs for logistic support along east-west supply axis, (OK - ask Max for his requirements.)

21. Accelerate program for jet applicable airfield. (What is the program? - John will follow.)

To the measures the Secretary added one of his own: "extend tours." It was incorporated into later versions of the list.

In addition to the above the Johnson report suggested two alternative deployments of a tailored division force to assist Vietnamese units in offensive action in II Corps. One was to deploy U.S. combat units to assume responsibility for security of the Bien Hoa-Tan Son Nhut air base complex, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon and Pleiku. The second was to deploy U.S. combat units to assume responsibility for defense of Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac provinces in II Corps. On the first alternative the Secretary noted: "Johnson does not recommend this;" he suggested that JCS should study, and "Max's and Westy's views" toward the second alternative should be sought. 139/

On 8 March, when Johnson was in Vietnam, the first two Marine battalions landed at Danang. Almost all of the intelligence reports during that month indicated our programs in Vietnam were either stalemated or failing. Not only was RVNAF strength considerably below the goals set and agreed upon, it was in considerable danger of actually decreasing. The situation on this score was indicated by the following table included in the March MACV report. 140/

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