Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 1.djvu/17

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

TOP SECRET – Sensitive

 

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
30 Jan 1964 (Cont'd)		removes the civilian government and puts him in power.
2 Feb 1964	MACV Personal Assessment of 4th Qtr CY 1963	The Diem coup and the subsequent political instability in the fall of 1963 are given by MACV as the main reasons for the rise in VC activity and the decline in GVN control of the country. The tempo of GVN operations was good but the effectiveness low. Military failures were largely attributed to political problems.
10 Feb 1964	CAS Group's Preliminary Report	The preliminary report of the special CAS group cross-checking the reporting system confirms the deterioration of the strategic hamlet program. It documents the decline in rural security and the increase in VC attacks.
12 Feb 1964	SNIE 50-64	This intelligence community evaluation of the short-term prospects for Vietnam confirms the pessimism now felt in all quarters. The political instability is the hard core problem.
18 Feb 1964	Final CAS Group Report	The final CAS group report confirms the black picture of its initial estimate in greater detail and further confirms the previous failings of the reporting system.
	JCSM 136-64	In addition to a long list of recommendations for GVN action, the JCS propose to SecDef major US escalatory steps including bombing of the North.
21 Feb 1904	MACV Comment on CAS Group Findings	General Harkins takes issue not with the specific factual reporting of the CAS Group, but with their broader conclusions about the direction the war is goings and the respective effectiveness of the VC and GVN.
2 Mar 1964	JCSM-174-64	The JCS outline their proposal for punitive action against the DRV to halt Northern support for the VC insurgency. Bombing is specifically called for.