NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive
perhaps Zorthian. The subjects of prime interest were how Khanh was taking hold, and the dangers of further coups. Next in importance were the effectiveness of the civil administration and the morale of major religious and political groups, and measures to strengthen and buttress the Khanh regime. On the economic side, the Secretary hoped to get a full review of the economy, the budget, price and supply trends, AID operations, and, finally, the possibility of land reform and tax forgiveness. On the military side, it was suggested they begin with the broad picture, and later proceed to selected critical provinces and specific provincial plans.
The main interest, with respect to intelligence and reporting, was to review Country Team recommendations concerning periodic assessments and joint reporting requirements. After this the interest centered on intelligence concerning the VC --specifically the extent of their control and activities in the provinces, intentions and tactics, and indicators thereof. Then, clearly in anticipation of possible requirement for public relations materials for use in U.S.:
4. Handling of intelligence bearing on control and direction of Viet Cong from North Vietnam including infiltration of personnel and weapons and operation of communications net. One of our basic projects here is preparing strongest possible material on this subject for use as appropriate to support stronger measures. We need to be sure your intelligence effort is geared to furnish such information promptly in usable form.
5. Review of draft (which we will supply) of control and support of VC by North Vietnam. 56/
Concerning current operational problems, the items foreseen to be of interest were policy on possible evacuation of dependents, review of GVN national and provincial plans, rural rehabilitation plans, adequacy and deployment of ARVN, status and problems of paramilitary forces, current status and possible expansion of the U.S. Special Forces' role in connection with Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), status of plans to reduce or reorganize U.S. forces as GVN became capable of performing functions currently performed by U.S., review of political and psywar progress, and of military tactics against VC, and "possible modification of existing operation [al] restrictions."
The special third country problems of French activities in RVN, and of Cambodia and Laos, would be dealt with in executive session.
The last item listed for special consideration was to review Operations Plan 34A-64, for feasibility, adequacy, and possible expan-
