Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 1.djvu/96

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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speculation about whether the use of nuclear weapons against North Vietnam would bring in the Russians. Rusk had been impressed, so he said, by Chiang Kai-shek's recent, strongly expressed opposition to any use by the United States of nuclear weapons. There was mention that Khiem had sought Chinese Nationalist military forces but their utility was generally deprecated, Bundy conjectured, for argument's sake, that nukes used in wholly unpopulated areas solely for purposes of interdiction might have a different significance than if used otherwise. It is not reported that any examination of effectiveness or of obviously possible countermeasures was essayed; and no decisions were made. But the direction of thinking was clearly away from measures internal to Vietnam, and clearly headed toward military actions against the North. 81/

At the conclusion of his visit to Vietnam in mid-April Secretary Rusk drew up the two-part summary list of added steps that he believed necessary. The first part, composed of actions presenting no substantive policy problems listed the following actions:

1. Engage more flags in South Vietnam.

2. Increase GVN diplomatic representation, and GVN information activity (to widen support of the GVN cause).

3. Enlist General Minh in the war effort.

4. Mobilize public support for war effort by civilian groups.

5. Improve the psychological warfare effort.

6. Discreetly cooperate with Khanh for the expulsion of "undesirable characters."

7. Empower Ambassador Lodge to make on-the-spot promotions to U.S. civilians in Vietnam.

Among the actions the Secretary felt should be considered, but which involved policy problems, were:

1. Maintain U.S. naval presence at either Tourane or Cam Ranh Bay, as a signal to Hanoi (to suggest to them our deep interest in affairs in Vietnam).

2. Spend more money in developing pacified provinces instead of concentrating efforts almost exclusively on trouble spots.

3. Push GVN anti-junk operations gradually north of the DMZ.
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