NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
D. McNamara Against Overt Pressures
When he returned from his visit to South Vietnam, Secretary McNamara recommended against either the United States or the G undertaking overt actions against North Vietnam "at this time." One compelling reason was General Khanh's expressed wish not to engage in overt operations until a firmer GVIl political base had been established, but there were others as well. Mr. McNamara regarded such actions as "extremely delicate. both from the military and political standpoints," because of specific problems. These were identified as: (1) the problem of justifying such actions; (2) the problem of "communist escalation"; and (3) the problem of pressures for premature negotiations. Moreover, he stated the judgment that the practical range of our overt options did not permit assured achievement of our practical objectives. In identifying these, he drew a distinction similar to that made by the interagency study group -- between the stated objective of eliminating Hanoi's control of the VC insurgency and the "practical" objectives of collapsing the morale and the self-assurance of the Viet Cong cadres...and bolstering the morale of the Khanh regime." [30]
What Mr. McNamara did recommend for military actions outside South Vietnam reflected the contemporary concerns over Laos. Prior to his visit the increased NVA activity in eastern Isos had prompted several recommendations for military measures to thwart new communist territorial gains in that country and to interrupt the flow of men and materiel into South Vietnam along the Laotian infiltration routes. In particular, elements within the Department of Defense urged efforts to lift existing restrictions on cross-border pursuit of engaged forces into Laos, including accompaniment of GW air and ground forces by U.S. advisory personnel. They also sought authorization for both GVIl and U.S. aircraft to overfly Laos for reconnaissance purposes.[31] The JCS urged low-level reconnaissance flights over Laos as advantageous both for collecting badly needed intelligence and for visibly displaying U.S. power. [32] The State Department recommended deploying twelve F-100's to Thailand, with a view toward its potential deterrence and signalling Impacts on communist activities in isos. [33] On his return from South Vietnam, two of the actions for which Secretary Vcilenara sought Presidential authority dealt with activities affecting Laos: (1) (Recommendation 11) "hot pursuit" and small-scale operations across the Laotian border by GVN ground forces "for the purpose of border control" and "continued high-level U.s. overflights" of the border; and (2) (Recommendation 12) preparations to be ready "to initiate the full range of Isotian and Cambodian border control actions" within 72 hours. [34]
Actions recommended by the Secretary to provide measures aimed directly at North Vietnam (Recommendation 12) fell into two categories: (1) preparation for "retaliatory actions," defined to include "overt high and/or low level reconnaissance flights...over North Vietnam" as well as "tit-for-tat" bombing strikes and commando-type raids; and (2) planning and preparations "to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the [sic] program of 'Graduated Overt Military Pressure' against North Vietnam The wording of the latter recommendation is notable because, at the time, there apparently was no planned overt "program" in existence; the discussion of overt pressures appended to the secretary's report was considerably less than even a recommendation for such a program. The concept of retaliatory actions was more explicitly defined, but here too, it was apparent
