NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
for approximate tine-phasing of the various steps in "the scenario"; (2) urged a fusion of the scenario with CICPAC operational planning (OPIAN 37/64); and (3) attempted to Incorporate Secretary Nearera's requested border control operations into the political actions recommended for the current time period. Moreover, the JCS developed a "political/military scenario" for graduated overt military pressure against North Vietnam, as called for in Secretary NcNamara's Recommendation No. 12, 16 March 1964. Within this scenario the JCS Included "expanded U.S. overt military pressures" against the DRV, In effect, they outlined a continually intensifying program of military pressures which Increasingly involved U.S. military participation.[57]
Complementing the thrust of JCS advice; the next draft, 8 April, removed current political actions from the list of political scenarios and treated them in a section entitled "Steps Which Should be Taken Now." The current scenarios included: (1) GN/FARMGATE graduated overt military pressures against North Vietnam; (2) separate Laotian and Cambodian border control actions; (3) separate GVN retaliatory actions against North Vietnam; and (4) overt U.S. graduated military pressures against North Vietnam. The detailed scenario. for the GVN/FARMGATE operations was reviewed by Mr. McNaughton with William Sullivan of the Department of State and Michael. Forrestal of the White House staff. The scenario version resulting from this conference, contains the JCS-recommended time-phasing, in terms of D-Day minus X approximations. It also incorporates specific military actions recommended by the JCS submission. Apparently, only this scenario and the detailed description of "Steps Which Should be Taken Now" were circulated. for comment by other agencies. Apparently, this draft provided the basis for scenario discussions held in Saigon among Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary William Bender CJS Wheeler, Ambassador Lodge and certain military and civilian members of the Country Team on 19-20 April 1964}}
A later version was prepared on 20 April and forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 23 April. Significantly, it contained only three scenarios: I. "Uncommitting" steps which should be taken now; II. GVN/FARMGATE graduated overt pressures on DRV; III. Contingency Plan for U.S. overt response to DRV/CHICOM reactions. It also carried the following comment concerning their relationship:
"It should be noted that carrying out Scenario I does not necessarily commit the U.S. to commence Scenario I; and that Scenario II may be carried out without requiring resort to Scenario III. Moreover, since Scenario II cannot be launched without our being prepared to carry out Scenario III, you should assume that It may be necessary for the D-Dey of Scenario III to occur as soon as 10 days after the D-Day of Scenario II. Scenario III is a contingency plan of action which we would contemplate putting into effect only if the DRV's or Chicon's reaction to Scenario II was judged by the President to require overt U.S. response." [58]
