The recommendation was based on an explicit assumption "that a decision to use force if necessary, backed by resolute and extensive deployment, and conveyed by every possible means to our adversaries, gives the best present chance of avoiding the actual use of such force." Reflecting the Influence of the national intelligence boards' rationale concerning "U.S. preparatory and low-scale action, the ExCom also stated the belief that "selective and carefully prepared military action against North Vietnam will not trigger acts of terror and military operations by the Viet Cong which would engulf the Khanh regime." [85] What the ExCom meant by "selective and carefully prepared military actions" is suggested by its request, on the same day, for JCS views on the feasibility of telegraphing intended action through military deployments. [86]
Despite its abandonment of the paced scenario approach, the ExCom proposed that many of the actions incorporated in the scenario be undertaken. Although proposing a particular order for these actions, the committee suggested that the sequence may need to be modified in reaction to specific developments, especially in view of different choices available to the enemy. In addition to the Presidential decision, the recommended actions included: (1) communication of our resolve and limited objectives to Hanoi through the Canadian intermediary; (2) conducting a high-level Southeast Asian strategy conference in Honolulu; (3) diplomatic initiatives at the Um to present the case for DRV aggression; (4) formal and bilateral consultation with SEATO allies, including the question of obtaining allied force commitments; (5) seeking a Congressional Resolution in support of U.S. resistance to communist aggression in Southeast Asia; (6) periodic: force deployments toward the region; and (7) an initial strike against North Vietnam, "designed to have more deterrent than destructive impact" and accompanied by an active diplomatic offensive to restore peace in the area --including agreement to a Geneva Conference. Further, the ExCom recommended that in the execution of these actions, all functional and geographic elements "should be treated as parts of a single problem: the protection of [all] Southeast Asia from further communist encroachment." [87]
If all of the decisions and actions contained in the draft memorandum were in fact recommended to the President, all of them were not approved immediately. It is doubtful that the President made the decision to use force if necessary, since some advisers were still urging the some kind of decision on him in the weeks to follow. The plan to convey a message to Hanoi by Canadian channels was carried out on June 18, but it may have been decided on already before the meeting, given the earlier negotiations with Ottawa.[88] The President did approve the calling of a conference in Honolulu "to review for [his] final approval a series of plans for effective action" in Southeast Asia. [89] U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia was explained by Ambassador Stevenson in a major UN speech on 21 May. He did not address the Security Council on this subject again until 6 August, after the Tonkin Gulf episode. It is doubtful if less publicized statements at the UI contained the "hitherto secret evidence" suggested in the ExCom sessions as "proving Hanoi's responsibility" before the world diplomats. [90] It is likely that questions of consulting with SEATO allies,
