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1942 |
Page
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| 8. |
U.S. assures France that she will be restored to full independence "in all the greatness and vastness" which she possessed before the war in Europe and in her colonies overseas. Letter from Mr. Murphy to General Giraud, 2 November 1942. (Other U.S. policy statements for 1942 are quoted in Document No. 11, page iv, following) |
16
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1943
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| 9. |
There follows a series of commuications concerning the use of Chinese troops in Indochina. The U.S. rejected the French protestations and contended that the problem was primarily military. (President Roosevelt's decision was influential in the eventual Chinese occupation of Tonkin and their subsequent replacement by the French.) |
17
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| a. |
Expressions of concern over Chinese participation in the liberation of Indochina by the French Committee of National Liberation. M. Henri Hoppenot memorandum to Mr. Adolph Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, 20 October 1943
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18
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| b. |
Mr. Berle expresses to the French that it is a military problem but privately expresses the fact that Chinese intervention forces the issue of Western colonialism versus Eastern liberation as a policy. Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Berle, 21 October 1943
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18
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| c. |
Berle writes to Edward Stettinius, Under Secretary of State, that military matters must predominate because if the Chinese do not intervene, then the U.S. must reconquer Indochina single-handed and later police and protect it against the Chinese. Memorandum by Berle to Stettinius, 22 October 1943
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19
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| d. |
Mr. John Carter Vincent, Assistant Chief of Far Eastern Affairs, views the post-war status of Indochina as a matter of speculation but does not rule out the influence of the Chinese. Memorandum by Vincent to Berle, 2 November 1943
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20
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| e. |
Stettinius recommends to the President that the problem is primarily military. Memorandum by Stettinius to President Roosevelt, 8 November 1943
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21
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| f. |
President Roosevelt defers judgment on Chinese involvement and leaves the whole matter to the "discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" as essentially a military problem. Memorandum by President Roosevelt to Stettinius, 9 November 1943
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21
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