Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/201

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

TOP SECRET

 

8. The principal obstacles to the execution of United States policy in pursuit of its objectives in the Far East are as follows;

a. The policy and action of the Soviet Union.

(1) The Soviet Communists have historically considered Asia as one of their principal objectives; Bolshevik ideology devotes a prominent place to the capture of the "colonial and semi-colonial" areas of the world, by which is meant principally Asia. Soviet policy in Asia has been aided by the fact that communists have been successful to a large degree in subverting indigenous nationalist movements; the capture of these movements has been a goal of Kremlin policy.

(2) The Kremlin has not yet resorted to the large-scale and open employment of Soviet armed forces, although the aggression by both North Koreans and Chinese Communists indicates that the Kremlin is willing to undertake greater risks than in the past.

(3) The Kremlin, besides supplying and directing leadership of communist parties in Asia, and building centers of subversion, infiltration, and revolution, is providing military assistance to communist forces in Asia, both in materiel and in technical personnel.

(4) The fact that the Soviet threat is world-wide in character has prevented the concentration of free world effort against the various forms of communist aggression in Asia. The combination of political, military, technical and propaganda support given by the Soviet Government to the communist assault in Asia confronts the United States and its principal allies with a major challenge which vitally affects world power positions.

b. The policy and action of Communist China.

(1) Communist China is already involved in a major military aggression in Korea, is publicly committed to an attempt to seize Formosa, may attack Hong Kong, and may increase its support to Ho Chih Minh to include the use of Chinese forces in Indochina. Communist success in these efforts would expose the remainder of Southeast Asia to attack and would sharply increase the threat to Japan and the remainder of the off-shore island chain. Such prospects lend greater effectiveness to the ordinary communist techniques of penetration and subversion and cause many Asians to remain on the side lines during the present phase of the struggle.