Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/23

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

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	U.S. aid (e.g., through France). Obstacles should not permit indecision to allocate aid money or materials; the "crux of the situation lies in prompt decisive action if desired political effect is to he attained." Griffin file copy of telegram sent to Acheson, 16 March 1950	292
115.	The U.S. assumes that France is determined to protect Indochina from communist encroachment, that success depends on indigenous support, and that France supports Bao Dai, but that the French position and ultimate intentions are not clear to the rest of the world. The U.S. requests France to make a public statement of the concessions to Indochinese nationalism. Acheson 1363 to Paris, 29 March 1950	301
116.	Acheson advises Griffin Mission of the implications for U.S. policy in Vietnam: (1) The prospect of U.S. aid indirectly would cause crisis (induce hyper-confidence in Viets); (2) Viets bitter at Huu appointment (and the U.S.) may magnify the U.S. role; (3) it is better for the U.S. if a national union government is set up; and (4) the aid program can more easily be worked out with Huu Government. Acheson 244 to Griffin, 9 April 1950	305
117.	Department of State requests an assessment of the strategic aspects of Indochina from a military point of view because of the threat of communist domination. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that the "mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at present of critical strategic importance to the United States," because of the requirement to stockpile strategic materials acquired there, as well as the threat to other states on the "line of containment." JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 10 April 1950	308
118.	The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the State Department on the importance of Southeast Asia to the U.S. However, the JCS urge a more forceful and positive U.S. position than expressed by State -- ".…in order to retrieve the losses resulting from previous mistakes on the part of the British and French, as well as to preclude such mistakes in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary that positive and proper leadership among the Western Powers be assumed by the United States in Southeast Asia matters." JCS Memorandum for SecDef, 2 May 1950	315
119.	The JCS recommend telling the French that the U.S. is prepared to assist France and the three Associated States and that arrangements for U.S. military aid be made. JCS Memorandum for SecDef, 2 May 1950	318