NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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5. The JCS strongly recommend the addition of a stipulation that the U.S. will consider taking military action unilaterally if necessary against Communist-China.
6. Approval of the policies would require a substantial upward revision of our economic and military assistance progress for SEA and Formosa, some (possibly substantial) increase in our forces in being — primarily, Naval and Air force units —, and a substantial and immediate increase in the scale of U.S. production.
7. Further military studies relating to the magnitude of military requirements to carry cut these courses of action and the manner in which they could best be met will be furnished in due course to the NSC.
COMMENTS OF THE JOINT SECRETARIES
The Joint Secretaries have not yet submitted any written comments.
- INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
- A CIA Special Estimate (SE22) (Tab B), and NIE 35/1, "Probable Developments in Indochina in 1952", (Tab C), relate to NSC 124.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That you discourage the making of any policy decisions by the NSC at this meeting.
This matter was put on the agenda of this meeting so that the President could discuss it with the Council before leaving on his vacation. He understands that the matter has not progressed far enough for final decision. There has not been sufficient time for anyone fully to consider the comments of the JCS. The JCS themselves need further tine to complete their studies of the military requirements involved and the impact of fulfilling these requirements on other programs and on our global strategy.
2. That the paper be referred back to the Senior Staff for revision in the light of the Council's discussion and the additional information which will be brought to bear on the problem.
The Senior Staff would, of course, take into account the general and specific comments of the JCS together with the further military studies which the JCS will submit to then.
3. That you advise the Council that in your opinion the basic decision involved in this paper should not be ta!:en until the military implications have been fully explored; that you are requesting the JCS to proceed immediately with studies of the nature referred to in their memorandum, with a view to providing the fullest possible information to the NSC — this on the planing assumption that the decision will be
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