Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/52

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET


SECSTATE

WASHINGTON

MARCH 16, 1950.

Sent Dept as : Dept pass Paris and ECA from Saigon

FROM GRIFFIN

A- The visit of this mission in Indochina has resulted in fol conclusions:

1- The wave communism is riding in Indochina is predominantly a nnationalist movement, not econ, social or ideological-

2- While situation is serious it does not justify defeatism, but does justify effective application US aid in endeavor to strengthen Bao Dai Viet Govt versus communist-controlled. Vietminh.

3- Viet Govt of Bao Dai is not a puppet, but an intensely nationalistic Govt struggling to secure more control and authority from Fr. Most these Viet elements with whom we have come in contact are outspokenly anti-Fr.

4- It is feasible thru econ aid program help win from HO's Vietminh the non-Communist elements that continue support Ho, as well as large proportion of present numerous fence-sitters It is believed this can be promoted by application Amer aid thru means Bao Dai Govt, increasing its appearance of independence, its local and international prestige, its ability to conduct useful works for benefit of common people. US aid wld thereby become major contributing factor psychologically and materially, provided it is bold, quick and generous.

SECRET

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