As regards mathematics and exact sciences in general, Comte fulfilled his task in a most admirable way. It is also recognised now that he was perfectly right in introducing the science of life (biology) and the science of human societies (sociology) in the cycle of sciences included in his "Positive Philosophy"; and it is also known what a formidable influence his Positive philosophy exercised on most men of science and thinkers in the second half of the nineteenth century.
But why, it is asked by those who otherwise fully appreciate the work of the great philosopher—why was Comte so weak when he undertook, in his second great work—the "Positive Politics"—the study of human institutions, especially the modern ones, and the study of Ethics?
How could a man, with such a vast and positive mind as Comte’s, finally become the founder of a religion and of a certain worship, as was the case with Comte in his declining days?
Some of his followers have tried to reconcile this last step of Comte with his previous work, maintaining that the philosopher had followed the same method in both his works—the "Positive Philosophy" and the "Positive Politics." But this is not correct. And this is why two such authorised and philosophical followers of Comte as Littré and John Stuart Mill reject the "Politics" and do not consider it even as a part of Comte’s philosophy. They merely see in it the result of an already weakened intelligence.
And yet, the contradiction which exists between these two works of Comte—his "Positive Philosophy" and his "Positive Politics"—is most characteristic, and it throws light upon some of the most important questions of the present day.
When Comte had finished his "Cours de philosophic positive," he must certainly have noticed that he had not yet introduced into his philosophy the most essential question: the origin of moral sense in man and the influence of this sense on the life of man and of human societies. It was evidently necessary in a course of Positive philosophy to study the origin of this feeling, and to explain it by the same causes by which Comte had explained life in general. He had to show why man, without the interference of any supernatural forces, should feel the need of obeying this feeling, or at least of reckoning with it.
It is most striking that Comte was on the proper way, which was followed later on by Darwin when he tried to explain, in the "Descent of Man," the origin of moral sense in Man. Comte
