It is insisted for the appellants that Patterson's claim—which was an open account—was barred by the limitation act of three years; because, as is contended, the statute commenced running at the time of the compromise and settlement, in 1861. The court thinks differently. The right of an attorney to sue for services does not accrue until the termination of the suit in which he was employed, unless the relation of client and attorney is sooner ended; Nichols v. Wilson, 11 M. & W. Excheq. Rep., 106; Fenno v. English, 22 Ark., 170; and in this case, we are clearly of opinion that the suit did not terminate until it was dismissed. The statute, therefore, did not commence running until October, 1865; and consequently the claim was not barred. As before remarked, the evidence does not show why Patterson did not dismiss the suit at an earlier period; but, if he was even guilty of negligence in this respect, it is not easy to perceive how it could affect the question here presented.
It follows that the court did not err in refusing to give the instructions moved by the appellants; nor is there any error in those given by the court, of which the appellants can complain.
Judgment affirmed.
