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quite different from that which is usually given to it. This is clearly evinced by the reasons which Socrates alledges. For how could he have said so generally, that the things which depend on God ought not to be made the subject of inquiry, before those which depend on man have been despatched, since not only are the latter connected in a variety of ways with the former, but even among things human there must be some of greater moment, others of less, some of nearer, others of more remote concern, and the proposition would lead to the con- clusion that before one was brought to its completion, not even the investigation of another ought to be begun. This might have been not unfairly turned by a sophist against Socrates himself, if he had dragged in a notion apparently less familiar, in order to illustrate another ; and certainly this proposition, taken in a general sense, would not only have endangered the conduct of life, but would also have altogether destroyed the Socratic idea of science, that nothing can be known except together with the rest, and along with its relation to all things beside. The real case is simply this. It is clear that Socrates had no peculiar talent for any single science, and least of all for that of physics. Now it is true that a merely metaphysical thinker may feel himself attracted toward all sciences, as was the case with Kant; but then this happens under different circumstances, and a different mental constitution from that of Socrates. He on the contrary made no excursions to points remote from his centre, but devoted his whole life to the task of exciting his leading idea as extensively and as vividly as possible in others ; his whole aim was, that whatever form man'^s wishes and hopes might take, according to individual character and accidental circumstances, this foundation might be securely laid, before he proceeded further. But till then his advice was, not to accu- mulate fresh masses of opinions ; this he for his part would permit only so far as it was demanded by the wants of active life, and for this reason he might say, that if those who investi- gated meteoric phenomena had any hope of producing them at their pleasure, he should be more ready to admit their re- searches: language, which in any other sense but this would have been absurd. We cannot therefore conclude from this that Socrates did not wish that physics should be cultivated, any more than we are authorised to suppose, that he fancied it