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Miscellaneous Observations.
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the house was his principal recommendation. In a debate on the Spanish depredations, which still continued unrepressed, he chanced to affirm that Porto-bello might be easily taken, if the officers did their duty; and led on by the ardour of debate he even pledged himself to capture the place, with only six ships of war, if they would put him in command. The opposition re-echoed his proposal. Vernon was called by anticipation a Drake and a Ralegh ; and his popularity knew no bounds. The minister, Sir R. Walpole, glad to appease the popular clamour, and to get rid for a time of Vernon's busy opposition in the Commons ; and hoping per- haps, like Nicias, that by the failure of his boast he would disgrace himself and his party, or else clear the seas of the Spaniards, — closed with his offlsr so lightly made ; and ac- tually sent him out with a fleet to the West Indies. Vernon sailed, and was as good as his word. He speedily took Porto-bello, and demolished all the fortifications. Both houses joined in an address ; Vernon rose to the highest pitch of popularity ; and " the nation in general (observes the historian) was wonderfully elated by an exploit, which was magnified much above its merit." A Sacheverel or a Vernon are quite sufficient pillars for party to rear a tri- umphal arch upon.

The extraordinary performance of an extravagant boast, under circumstances unexpectedly favourable, is not more observable in both cases, than the speedy exposure of the inability of both commanders, when subsequently put to the test. The hero of Sphacteria at the head of a brave army in Thrace, with which he did not know what to do[1] next, like a chess-player who does not see his next move, is absolutely ludicrous. The conduct of the conqueror of Porto-bello, when entrusted with a powerful fleet on a larger field of action, is equally decisive of his real merits. He failed most miserably as admiral on the West India station; thus showing that a coup-de-main, whether in politics or war, though it often succeed most signally, is no safe evidence of general ability.

W. S.
  1. Thuc. V. 7.