The author of this work tells us that though its "pages have taken shape in connection with class-room work, they are intended as an independent contribution to ethical science. ... The backbone of the theory here presented" is said to be "the conception of the will as the expression of ideas, and of social ideas; the notion of an objective ethical world realized in institutions which afford moral ideals, theatre, and impetus to the individual; the notion of the moral life as growth in freedom, as the individual finds and conforms to the law of his social placing." For this backbone the author acknowledges his indebtedness to Bradley, Edward Caird, and Alexander.
The work is divided into three parts: (I) Fundamental Ethical Notions — the Good, Obligation, Freedom; (II) The Ethical World — Social Relations, Moral Institutions; (III) The Moral Life of the Individual — Formation and Growth of Ideals, Moral Struggle, or the Realizing of Ideals, Realized Morality, or the Virtues. A "Conclusion" gives the gist of the whole.
It is somewhat difficult to restate the ethical theory propounded in this book. It is acknowledged in great measure Hegelian. The human will (and, indeed, the Divine Will) seems to be conceived as a sort of force or activity, whose nature it is to determine itself in accordance with ideas; and this determination is freedom. There seems to be no other difference between this will-activity and the "fire" (πῦρ, πρηστήρ) of Herakleitos than the name; for that philosopher conceived his fire as determining itself according to a Ao'yos, and as including both the divine and human minds. We are, accordingly, prepared for a statement like this: "To regard even a Divine Being as the author of obligation is to make it a form of external constraint, appealing to hope or fear [why not to love?], unless this Divine Being is shown to be organically [why not morally and affectively?], connected with the self"; that is, shown to be the total process of which the self is an essential part, member, or moment. It is easy enough to see what sort of ethics must result from a system like this, which may be called indifferently Panlogism or Cosmism. We find, indeed, "the ethical postulate" printed in capitals (p. 131) to be this: "In the realization of individuality there is found also the needed realization of some community of persons [why not individuals?] of which the individual is a member; and conversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he shares, by that same conduct satisfies himself." Here it is clear that the converse, if it is really to be a converse, must mean: in
