so the law of justice states a certain relation of active wills to one another" (p. 175). "A moral law ... is the principle of action, which, acted upon, will meet the needs of the existing situation as respects the wants, powers, and circumstances of the individuals concerned." Could we similarly say: 'The law of gravitation is the principle of motion, which [if] acted upon, will meet the needs of the existing situation, as respects the wants, powers, and circumstances of the bodies concerned'? Is there any 'if' implied in the latter case at all? And does not the necessity for this 'if' in the former show clearly that there is a fundamental difference, — the difference between freedom and determinism, — between the moral law and the law of gravitation? And does not the attempt to represent them as of the same nature show that Professor Dewey's ethical system is deterministic?
This comes out still more clearly in Part III, where he treats of "The Moral Life of the Individual." Here we read: "Intelligence deals with the nature and relations of things, and we call it understanding; intelligence deals with the relations of persons and deeds, and it is termed conscience" (p. 184). But may not the relations of persons and deeds be understood? Is there no science of sociology or of economics? Or is it by means of the conscience that these sciences are evolved? Let sociologists and economists answer!
In treating of the relations of "The Reflective Conscience and the Ethical World," Professor Dewey agrees with Hegel in maintaining that "to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition of one's country," and with Bradley in holding that "the wish to have a morality of one's own better than that of the world [as it is?] is to be on the threshold of morality" (p. 189). Would not this justify the suttee of the Hindoos, the child-murder of the Spartans, the prostitution of the Babylonian women (Herod. I, 199)? To be sure, Professor Dewey says: "Reflective intelligence cross-questions the existing morality, and extracts from it the ideal which it pretends to embody, and thus is able to criticise the existing morality in the light of its own ideal" (p. 190). But were not the horrors alluded to part of the ideal of the peoples named, and should we not, nevertheless, admire the Spartan mother who protected her feeble child with her own life, despite the Spartan ideal? Should we not consider her moral just because she refused "to live in accordance with the moral traditions of her country"?
There are other points in the book that deserve consideration; but I have perhaps said enough to give a notion of its contents and tendency. I have allowed Professor Dewey, in the main, to speak for himself, drawing only a few obvious corollaries from his principles, and putting a few questions. Criticism would be out of place, unless it
