Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/157

Quite distinct from this metaphysical Idealism, however, is the epistemological Idealism which is opposed, not to Materialism, but to Realism. Here the question at issue is not the problem of the ultimate constitution of the universe; it is the question of the theory of knowledge — in its most obvious and easy form, — the question of the external world and the nature of the existence we are prepared to assign to it. Has it any existence beyond the minds of the conscious beings who perceive it, or is percipi its whole esse? Does the actual and possible experience of conscious beings constitute an exhaustive account of its modus essendi? Is it a mere phenomenon, a mental appearance, or does it possess in some sense an extra-conscious reality of its own? The question might be more exactly formulated, for as soon as we essay a solution we find that it involves not only the existence of what we usually call the external world, but all existence whatever beyond my conscious states. It includes, therefore, the validity of my belief in the existence of other conscious beings. But the question itself and its details are not at present before us: we are not called upon at this stage to do more than indicate its general nature. It is obvious that we are here in the presence of a set of problems of a widely different range and import from the metaphysical problem indicated a minute or two ago. We are dealing with the preliminary question of the extent and validity of knowledge — in a word, with epistemology, not with metaphysics or ontology. It is equally obvious that epistemological Idealism does not coincide with the metaphysical Idealism sketched above. Berkeley is usually classed as a subjective Idealist in the epistemological sense; and if we accept this classification, we might say that in his case the two senses of Idealism happen to fit the same person. But Berkeley is NOT a consistent subjective idealist: he is only an immaterialist. He believes in the real trans-subjective existence of other finite spirits, and of God the infinite Spirit, and it is his epistemological Realism in these respects that enables him to reach his metaphysical Idealism — his conviction of order and reason at the heart of things. Consistent epistemological idealism must