characterize it simply as neurasthenia. In the book of M. Huyghe the inverse of pessimistic states of mind is arthritism, a morbid diathesis characterized by a tendency to local congestions of various kinds. In regard to this P. finds that the connections of arthritism with pessimism are defined with just about the same evidence, and imperfect evidence, as are the connections which M. Magalhāes finds to exist between pessimism and neurasthenia. It is evident that the whole of pessimism is not arthritism, and that all arthritism is not pessimism.
There is an obvious continuity between the diverse ethics of Kant and Hegel. Both start from man, but Kant considers the subjective ego, Hegel the objective ego. Both seek to obey the command, "Know thyself," but the self was different to the two. To find it Kant looked inward and Hegel outward. The difference between them is thus the difference between an abstract self and a concrete self. Hegel avoids all abstract conceptions. True, he starts from them, but only in order to criticise and pass beyond them to a real concrete. To him there can be no duty without an objective good and hence Kant's formal law is valueless. After this introduction the remainder of the article (pp. 180-201) is a brief exposition of Hegel's ethics, based mainly on the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts
METAPHYSICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL.
There are three responses possible to the question of the active and proper force of the intelligence in face of the world; pure naturalism, pure idealism (both of these have the common error of intellectualism the seeking to explain our ideas and mental structure in the nature of intelligence, whether active or passive), and the theory of F., which finds an explanation to a great extent of the forms of thought in the functions of will and in those necessities of life to which Lamarck and Darwin have drawn the attention of philosophers. Instead of "returning to Kant," let us pass Kant, pass Schopenhauer even, pass Spencer too; according to a true evolutionism ideas ought to become the supreme forms of life and volition, instead of remaining inactive in a world ruled by material laws. The question of idea-forces (des idées-
