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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. I.

up the discussion, as if the whole matter were settled by a definition. It is natural and reasonable that we should turn to animal life itself, to ascertain whether there are traces of the rudiments of ethical distinctions appearing in the conduct of animals. However faint, obscure, and rare the traces may be, we shall find much to interest in the search for them. After the gathering of evidence is fairly complete, we shall be able to reach a conclusion on the question of "animal ethics." In any case, we may find here a suitable avenue towards the higher problems of a philosophy of rational life. For we need to learn more fully the ethics of evolution, and specially to ascertain the phases of animal conduct suggesting to the evolutionist traces of the beginnings of moral life. Current popular expressions go heavily against the supposition that animals are responsible for their conduct, as we are; but there should be no obstacle in the way of fresh observation, and a revisal of traditional conceptions. There are, besides, many things to favor Spencer here, for there is an undying interest in questions of animal intelligence. The stream of stories is unending, and we never seem to weary of hearing how many ingenious things the dumb creatures can accomplish. Certainly there has been a large reward for those who have consecrated time and patience to the study of animal life. It seems as if literature might ere long be enriched with the biographies of favorite animals. The times are, therefore, favorable to a discussion of "animal ethics." Herbert Spencer is not too early on the field. He has also the advantage of having studied the whole problems of morality from the lower side, having approached them with the belief that all vital movement is an organic whole, advancing by fixed destiny towards the elevations of ethical activity. We can have no better guide to the discovery of the traces of ethical distinctions in animal life, if these are to be found. A brief summary of his positions will guide inquiry.

In the evolution of conduct, "something which may be regarded as animal ethics is implied." Contemplating "conduct in general," that is, the activity of animal life as a whole, "the highest conduct is that which conduces to the greatest length,