which a healthy existence is maintained, and in accordance with the law of the pleasurable, — accepting the postulate of hedonism as applicable in their case, — the end of their life is served. These things seem to include the whole circle of conduct so far as we can legitimately speak of the action natural to an animal, — action which the animal, left to itself, will naturally do. If we pass beyond this to consider for what ends animals can be used by us, we part from the region of natural history, and from the method proper to our inquiry. If we bring new conditions into the life of the dog and horse, training them to do what they would not do unless trained, we introduce into animal life what does not belong to it under natural law. If in this way we introduce a kind of rule or order of service for animals; and if, in view of this, we begin to speak of "something which may be regarded as animal ethics," the ethics are of our own introduction; they do not appear in actions "proper to the species," but only in actions possible to them under the regulation of man. If it be action "proper" to a dog to point, or to watch our property; and to a horse to draw a carriage, this is no more the end of action natural to the dog and horse, than it is the end of a sheep to produce good mutton. Beyond all question, it is clear that natural laws provide for "the preservation and prosperity of species": but nature does not provide us with watch-dogs, any more than she provides us with wheel-carriages. If animals are to be useful to us in the field of action, we must make them so: we must put into them an aptness unattainable without our guidance, must put into them certain results of our own thought, thus establishing habits which will answer to our call. If, as the result, we begin to see a kind of morality in these animals, we see only a dim reflection of what is in ourselves, and which we have imprinted only for reasons of self-interest.
Our sole purpose here is to form an estimate of so-called "animal ethics"; but we linger for a moment to remark that such phenomena as are consequent on human training, are not available in the service of a theory of evolution. These phenomena are superinduced; they presuppose man's dominion; they belong to a later stage in the history of life — a stage at
