The same can be said of the desires. A present desire, so far as it is a mere wish for an object, is not an efficient cause or motive of volition, but it must first reach the stage of an "impulsive idea," into which it may readily, and perhaps usually does, develop. It must take on, however, the character of a final cause with something of resolution and purpose before it is properly a motive that has any efficiency to produce volition.
What has been said is equivalent to dividing "motives" into efficient causes (ratio fiendi] and final causes (ratio agendi) of conduct. But they are not reciprocally exclusive of each other. There are "motives" to action which are only efficient causes, and these are such as the reflexes and the instincts, according to the common conception of them. They produce an act immediately and necessarily upon their occurrence in the organism, and leave no room whatever for consciousness, deliberation, or choice. Hence they bring all such actions under the law of causality in a form that excludes freedom. But then we are privileged not to call such actions volitions at all. Then there are "motives" to conduct which are both efficient and final. These are comprehended under the conception, ideas of ends, which have to be called into existence, perhaps by the emotions or other mental states, or even by external influences, before they can be operative. These ideas, being the free creation of the mind, in so far as their form and matter are concerned, although their occurrence may be necessary, confer upon the act they originate the freedom they themselves possess. This claim, however, may not have all the certitude that is desirable, and we do not urge it in the form expressed. What we require from the distinction is, that actions initiated solely by efficient causes, or "motives," such as the instincts and reflexes, or even the emotions and desires considered as efficient agencies, are not free, but are necessary, and exclude either the presence and interposition of consciousness or the existence of alternative possibilities, while actions initiated by final causes, motives as ideas of ends, which may also be efficient, require by this very fact to be radically distinguished from mechanically conditioned conduct. The presence of a final cause is what makes them
