and intensify the distinction between the sensitive subject and objects independent of itself. The infant whose pains of deprivation are ended by the presentation of the mother's breast, the snail which puts forth its horns and comes in contact with an object in its path,[1] are alike in a fair way towards realizing the existence of independent objects. It may be taken as pretty generally acknowledged that the consciousness of independent externality is given chiefly in the sense of effort and the phenomena of resisted energy. Here we see the category of causality, as it were, alive before us in instinctive action. Hence, as Mr. Spencer says, "the root-conception of existence beyond consciousness becomes that of resistance plus some force which the resistance measures."[2] Of such a simple quasi-reflex character are the experiences which "yield subject and object as independent existences."[3] We do not require to go for them to the rational consciousness of man. In reacting upon a stimulus, the sensitive subject projects or reflects its feeling out, interprets it as the sign of an independent somewhat. In this sense we may agree with Mr. Spencer that " the Realistic interpretation of our states of consciousness" is "deep as the very structure of the nervous system, and cannot for an instant be actually expelled";[4] or, as Professor Laurie puts it, the affirmation of independent externality is a necessary reflex movement of sense. "By a reflex action of consciousness things are constituted objects and external. This movement, moreover, lies in the heart of consciousness; and through it alone is consciousness possible."[5]
This being so, then — Realism being incontestably prior — philosophical reflection supervenes, and subjects this primitive and instinctive consciousness to a sceptical criticism, which aims either at establishing some form of Idealism or at reducing us to complete Scepticism. This criticism, as already remarked, is both salutary and necessary ; for if Realism is
