mined to act accordingly."[1] "The Reason which Obliges every man in Practice, so to deal always with another, as he would reasonably expect That Other should in like circumstances deal with Him, is the very same, as that which forces him in Speculation to affirm, that if one line or number be equal to another, That Other is reciprocally equal to it."[2] In short, the same faculty of reason which determines what things are, determines what ought to be. The same faculty which decides in regard to the law of right supplies the dynamic force which is necessary for the realization of the law.
From this point of view, the standard of right and the criterion of truth are the same. Since reason determines what ought to be done, it must use its own criterion, namely, self-consistency or absence of contradiction. The distinction between right and wrong is therefore the same as the distinction between true and false. A vicious action is one which involves a contradiction. "Iniquity is the very same in Action as Falsity or Contradiction in Theory"[3] Conversely, of course, right action and correct thinking are identical in their essential nature. The necessary consequence of this position is that the dynamic force which impels us to act rightly is the same as that which makes us think correctly. More accurately stated, the conclusion is that we are impelled to fulfil our moral obligations, when we know what they are, by the same force which compels us to assent to a truth when we know the demonstration on which it depends. Clarke, as we have seen, does not shrink from accepting this result, and yet it is a result which might well cause some misgiving. We assent to a demonstrated truth, because, as rational beings, we cannot possibly do otherwise. In like manner we cannot possibly believe anything which we know to be self-contradictory. We have no choice in matters of this sort. If right action and correct thinking stand on the same basis, therefore, it is clear that a wrong action is an utter impossibility. Clarke admits, of course, that there is such a thing as moral evil, and he attributes its existence to the freedom of the will. "Assent to a plain specu-
