Page:Philosophical Review Volume 15.djvu/43

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HUME AND THE HISTORICAL METHOD.
[Vol. XV.

cepts on which social psychology now makes so much. As we shall see, Hume's failure to appreciate the complexity of the social relations and the plasticity of the individual is the essential weakness of his attitude toward the historical method. In view of the nature of the individualism current in his time, however, it is important to emphasize his actual contribution in this respect rather than his shortcomings. His position on this point is undoubtedly an advance in the direction of what we now regard as essentially the historical attitude.

There would seem to be no doubt, then, that Hume contributed to the historical method a more adequate conception of the social nature of the individual and of the organic structure of society than was generally prevalent among his contemporaries. In his ethics he developed a consistent theory, of which his view of the relation of egoism and altruism was an integral part. His views of society never took a systematic form, and on this side his contribution to historical method is rather in the nature of keen insight and brilliant suggestion than of sociological theory. Of course, it is not to be denied that there are many passages in the essays which bear in the direction of the old, abstract individualism; this is invaribly the case when an important conception is still at the stage of suggestion. But neither can there be any doubt that the germs of a better theory are present, or that Hume really had a share in the development of that new view of society with the inception of which the name of Montesquieu is generally associated.[1]

If we turn now to the second side of our question and inquire concerning Hume's direct contribution to the historical method itself, the answer will depend to a considerable extent on the comparisons we institute between Hume and other writers. If, for example, we compare Hume's conception of historical continuity with that found in the works of the best historians of our own time, the contrast will be hopelessly disparaging to Hume. Again, if we compare his strictly historical work with that of the

  1. L'esprit de lois appeared in 1748. All the essays we have considered were published prior to that date except those "Of National Characters" and "Of the Original Contract," which appeared in that year.