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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. XV.

ETHICS, SOCIOLOGY, AND PERSONALITY.

THE determination in general terms of the nature of the 'highest good' or 'intrinsic good,' of the meaning of 'conscience' and 'obligation,' the definition of types of 'virtue,' the discussion of the relations of 'egoistic' and 'altruistic ' tendencies in human action, etc., are all without doubt indispensable elements of ethical theory. Nevertheless, the doubt is legitimate as to whether such general philosophical concepts in ethics can have much value in application to the problems of the concrete ethical life unless they are supplemented and enriched by investigations of a much more empirical and historical character. And when one further considers that no single concept of the highest good or supreme ethical end that is either generally accepted or scientifically irrefutable has yet been attained, the further doubt may arise as to whether after all there may not be something in the nature of the subject-matter that makes it impossible to frame a self-coherent concept of the 'good' which shall at the same time carry the qualities of rational objectivity and compulsion, and be applicable to the indefinite variety and complexity of actual life.

That such a central concept or principle would be of the greatest practical value as well as theoretical significance, if it were possible of achievement, will hardly be questioned. It is the business of ethics to render systematic and rational, so far as may be possible, the actual principles of valuation that control ethical judgment. A careful observer of our social life will scarcely deny that, after many centuries of ethical investigation, confusion and even serious inconsistency still obtain in the ethical judgments of occidental civilization. There are, for example, inconsistencies between private morality and business morality, between private morality and political morality, etc. Perhaps shining examples of such confusion are the present status of social judgment on the marriage and divorce problem, and on the so-called problem of 'tainted wealth.'

Is it possible to define a system of universal or objective types