adequate. If the time-process is real, such atonement for the earlier by the later—for the less adequate representations by the more adequate—is conceivable; but if it is unreal, the atonement is not conceivable.[1]
We have now considered the various ways known to us in which one might try to reconcile man's belief in the compensating power of the later stages of life with the doctrine of the unreality of change, and we have shown that each of these attempts must end in failure. We cannot as a result of our survey assert out-right that the doctrine and the belief are incompatible; for perhaps one might attempt a reconciliation in some other way that has not occurred to us.[2] But I think that we are justified in saying that so far as we can at present see, man's belief in the supreme importance of the later stages can be defended only if we conceive the temporal character of human life in the way that we have suggested. As the matter stands at present, we must either adopt this conception or condemn as utterly mistaken our belief in the transforming power of the later stages. Now there can be little question that we feel it to be of vital importance that the fuller realizations of value shall appear in the later stages of a man's history. So long as a life falls short of complete attainment, we demand that at least it shall show
- ↑ The conclusion that is really indicated by Dr. McTaggart's argument is, to my mind, not that change is unreal, but that the universe, at present actually imperfect and in process of change, may eventually reach a state of perfection and that then change will cease. This is the only intelligible interpretation that I can give to the doctrine of the eventual passage of time into eternity. And it is, it seems to me, a theory that one might conceivably adopt, although personally I do not feel sure that perfection and change are incompatible. But although this seems to be the conclusion to which his argument points, it is evident that Dr. McTaggart would not be willing to accept it. For while apparently he would not object to the identification of eternity with changelessness, he is definitely committed to the doctrine of the unreality of change.
Professor Overstreet, in an article entitled " Change and the Changless " (this journal, Vol. XVIII, pp. i ff.), seeks to show, among other things, that a perfect being may undergo change. While there are some parts of his theory that I am unable to accept, it seems to me that on this particular point he has presented a forceful argument and that he has at least shown that the common belief in the incompatibility of change and perfection is open to question. - ↑ It should be remembered also that we did not try to prove that value is something other than completeness but merely declared that the burden of proof rests with any one who may ask us to regard the two as identical.
