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(mind) and the self is, to my mind, important and may aid in the clarification of the situation as regards the vexed problem of the mental and the non-mental. In my own thinking some such distinction has been of decided assistance here. Whether the author succeeds in drawing the distinction strictly in accordance with the facts is an open question; but I cannot but feel that his distinction at least points in the right direction. The discussion of the unity of the self, however, leaves much to be desired. In the first place, too much of the burden of analysis is thrown upon 'everyman'; more analysis on the author's part would have been of assistance in getting at his point of view and would probably have disclosed the inadequacy of that point of view. Of course, the whole conception turns upon what is to be understood by the metaphorical 'interweaving' of the activities; until this term is defined and there is nothing in the discussion which aids in its definition the whole point of view is vacuous. And, furthermore, until the fundamental question, Why should these activities 'interweave'? is answered the problem of the unity of the self remains unsolved; for surely the logically basic element of that problem is the unity per se. The fact of the matter seems to be that the author's whole discussion of the problem is biased by the initial prejudice that the self is and must be somehow once and for all given; in other words, he seems hardly to have freed himself from the traditional 'substance' hypothesis.

Some other interesting chapters in the book are those which deal with the problems of perception, nature of knowledge and existence of universals, and relations. The discussions here are searching and suggestive, though naturally they are colored by the author's view—to me unsatisfactory—of the relation between self and 'content.' The consideration of the problem of knowledge is especially interesting, but it does not seem to me that the author succeeds in making plausible the doctrine of truth as resemblance.

G. Watts Cunningham.

University of Texas.

 

The following books also have been received:

Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. Vol. IX. Edited by James Hastings. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917.—pp. xx, 911.

The Greek Genius and its Influence. Edited, with an introduction, by Lane Cooper. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1917.—pp. ix, 306.

Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept. By Benedetto Croce. Translated by Douglas Ainslie. London, The Macmillan Company, 1917.—pp. xxxi, 606.

Problems of the Self. By John Laird. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1917.—pp. xiii, 375.

An Introduction to the History of Science. By Walter Libby. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917.—pp. x, 288.

The Problem of Life in the Russian Novel. By Radoslav A. Tsanoff. The Rice Institute Pamphlet, Vol. IV, No. 2. Houston, Texas, The Rice Institute, 1917.—pp. 153.