versal ellipse does not explain the fact that particular elliptical curves exist; nor does the flavor that pervades any historical period determine the existence of the events of that period. It is often argued that since nature shows unity, there must be an agent that designed this unity, just as a watch presupposes a watchmaker. From such reasoning by analogy it follows that the most mechanistic parts of nature would afford the clearest cases of purpose, and man who is least mechanical would be the least a creation of divine design. As a matter of fact, man's inventions are imitations of nature's most mechanistic parts; and if we are to reason by analogy at all, we should proceed from nature to human conduct, rather than from man to nature. Finally, it is commonly reasoned that in proportion as a combination of parts (such as our universe) is remarkable it gives evidence of design. But, unfortunately, when there is only one case of the combination in existence (as is the case with our universe) it makes no difference how heavy the odds are against that particular combination, it may, nevertheless, logically be attributed to mere chance.
Not the coördination, but the organization of interests we consider as the criterion of moral value. This organization may be a moral procedure, for it may be the functioning of several interests as one. Indeed, organized conflict is essential to so moral an interest as the eagerness constantly to extend experience. In the especial case of desiring to extend one's own experience so as to share another's, organization is necessary, for coördination is inadequate. Valuable conflict, however, is internal and not external; for internal conflict, in which one embodies one's opponent's purpose without yielding one's own results is development; whereas external conflict, in which two neural processes are obstructed, is valueless. Furthermore, internal conflict generates creative activity, the necessary condition of which is plasticity of the undetermined association centers. Such plasticity may be affected by ill health or fatigue, or a tendency highly specialized. But the creative interest, which is morality's highest achievement, needs such a problem as conflict presents. In fact, any sensori-motor response which unites diverse qualities is an organized and not a coördinated reaction. Hence, if behavior, to be moral, had to be coördinated, it would be impossible to react to the universe as a unit; and yet, such reaction is necessary from a religious standpoint. Morality seems, then, to require organization as well as coördination of interest.
Kant rejected the traditional arguments for the existence of God—the ontological, cosmological, and teleological. He gave up these arguments because of their supposed deficiencies; and, by denying the knowableness of
