832-837, Schmid, K. Chr. Erh.
832) Schmid, K. Chr. Erh.: Versuch einer Moralphilosophie. Large 8vo. Jena. Cröker. pp. 520. Second and enlarged edition. 1792. pp. xii, 840. Third and enlarged edition. 1795. pp. 1000, with an index. Fourth edition, revised and enlarged. Large 8vo. 1802. Vol. I, Introduction, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Vol. II, Metaphysik der Sitten und angewandte Moral. Two alphabets, eighteen sheets. (Against Schmid, cf. nos. 274, iv; 275; 573; 595-598. The book attracted attention at the time of its publication, as being the first system of moral philosophy elaborated on the Kantian basis. It falls into (1) the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft [the false moral principles, and the true Kantian one: the highest good; moral motives; compatibility of the pure and the empirical practical reason; metaphysical and moral freedom], (2) the Metaphysik der Sitten [moral ontology, or analysis of all pure moral concepts; pure Ethics, or complete table of laws for all rational beings; moral ascetics, or aprioristic theory of the means to virtue for all finite rational beings], and (3) angewandte Moral or practical anthropology [deduction of the separate human duties from Kant's pure principles]. Very characteristic of this work, as of all Schmid's independent writings, is the refinement of subdivision, which almost exhausts the printer's resources, and in which, of course, the table of categories plays a principal rôle. The rigorism of Kant is modified: duty may prescribe for us the caring for happiness as well: the consciousness of having performed a duty is a part of happiness. An important divergence from Kant is Schmid's doctrine of intelligible Fatalism. In the second edition this doctrine is worked out afresh, defended against the many objections that had been taken to it, and is the root of many further deviations from Kant in the parts of the book which are connected with it. Schmid was led to it by the reflection, that in no other way could the existence of evil be explained, but would have to be referred—and with it morality as well—to an irrational chance. He therefore assumes, that mankind is only free in moral action. In immoral action there is no freedom. In that case, the intelligible substrate limits the operations of reason in the world of phenomena, or makes them impossible. There is, therefore, no blame before God; but only a less or a greater merit. In acting wrongly, mankind are not completely master of themselves, are not in possession of the use of their moral freedom. It is wrong and inconsistent of Schmid
