tion, though not hypotheses as to the nature of heat in particular. In Nov. Org., I, 106, Bacon seems to recognise the modern scientific view of the relation of induction, hypothesis, deduction, and verification. "But in establishing axioms by this kind of induction, we must also examine and try whether the axiom so established be framed to the measure of those particulars only from which it is derived, or whether it be larger and wider.[1] And if it be larger and wider, we must observe whether by indicating to us new particulars it confirm that wideness and largeness as by a collateral security;[2] that we may not either stick fast in things already known, or loosely grasp at shadows and abstract forms; not at things solid and realised in matter." It is difficult to realise the necessity for this verification of hypothesis by deduction of particulars in a method which, by exhaustive exclusion of instances, arrives at axioms with mechanical certainty.
So far, we have noticed, in connection with Bacon's formal inductive method of exclusions, cases where he seems to have recognised the value of hypothesis. There are also cases outside that method. Take, for example, his "First Vintage concerning the Form of Heat."[3] First Vintage is an 'essay,' an "indulgence of the understanding," a hypothesis as to the nature of heat. Prerogative Instances are fortiora auxilia in usum intellectus[4] and therefore outwith Bacon's formal method. Like the Three Tables of Instances, differences in prerogative are determined by different principles which are, as it were, hypotheses as to the best general mode of induction. A Crucial Instance[5] serves to decide which of two hypotheses shall be accepted. Speaking of Instances Conformable,[6] Bacon seems to recognise the sagacity necessary for the formation of hypotheses. "In fine, a certain sagacity in investigating and hunting out Physical Conformities
