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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. IV.

However, Right Reason, in the sense above explained, leads us to formulate certain Laws of Nature. Such a 'law' is defined as "the dictate of Right Reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies." The first and fundamental Law of Nature is "that peace is to be sought after, where it may be found; and where not, there to provide ourselves for helps of war."[1] From this law, all the others,—twenty in De cive, eighteen in Leviathan,—are derived. "They direct the ways, either to peace or self-defense."

We are not here concerned with the enumeration and deduction of the particular Laws of Nature, which will readily be found by referring to Leviathan, De cive, or De corpore politico. The question as to their exact significance (qua Laws of Nature), however, is of the greatest importance for the system; and it is just here that the expositions of Hobbes are least helpful. The philosopher himself says: "The Laws of Nature are immutable and eternal: what they forbid can never be lawful; what they command can never be unlawful."[2] At the same time, it is important to observe that in a state of nature it would be irrational for a man to obey these laws, for he would have no assurance that others would do the same. Such conduct would defeat the end which all these laws have in mind, i.e., the preservation of the individual. Indeed, as Hobbes reminds us, they are not 'laws' at all in the ordinary sense, "since they are nothing else but certain conclusions, understood by reason, of things to be done and omitted";[3] whereas the element of compulsion is essential to 'law' in the strict sense.

In order that there may be any security whatever, a government of some sort must be established. The many conflicting wills must be changed into one, not by a change in human nature,—which, of course, is impossible,—but by the several individuals submitting themselves either to a "council" or to "one man." In this compact, the individual gives up all but

  1. De cive, vol. ii, p. 16. Cf. Leviathan, vol. iii, p. 117.
  2. De cive, vol. ii, p. 46.
  3. Ibid., p. 49.