standard of his own actions, which he does at his own peril, but also the measure of other men's reason with respect to his affairs,"[1] our author adds that this cannot be the case, "For, out of civil society, any one may distinguish Right Reason without making a comparison with his own. Because there is a common standard … the Nature of Things, as it lies before us, carefully to be observed and examined by all our faculties."
The first of the passages just quoted is one of the most perplexed in the whole treatise. Right Reason is not an "infallible faculty," yet "not false in these acts of judging"; it is not properly an "act of reasoning," but the resulting "true propositions,"—yet these "acts of reasoning" are, after all, to be included under Right Reason. This seems hopeless, but perhaps we may find what Cumberland means by not expecting to find too much. First, with regard to that other expression so often used, 'The Nature of Things.' Cumberland is a wholly naïve realist. By the Nature of Things he seems to mean all that actually and objectively is,—including God as well as his world. And it is needless to say that Cumberland's God is a 'transcendent' deity. This Nature of Things being posited, we have a perfectly objective standard as regards not only theoretical truths but practical propositions. The Reason of man is such as to fit him to apprehend this Nature of Things exactly as it is, always provided that he does not, by a 'free' act of will, choose to assent to that which is not clear and distinct. Cumberland's test of truth and theory of error are the same as Descartes's; he differs from the founder of modern philosophy, of course, in his rejection of 'innate ideas.' For Cumberland, then, having no theory of cognition other than that of common-sense, and caring only for the truth of the deliverances of Right Reason, it is a matter of indifference whether we call the latter a 'faculty,' an 'act of reasoning,' or the resulting 'true propositions.' In the last resort, Cumberland, like Descartes, seems to depend upon the necessary truthfulness of God.
We now see what, in general, Cumberland holds regarding
- ↑ This would apply, of course, only in the 'state of nature.'
