Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/304

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
288
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. IV.

the rational nature of man; and proposes to demonstrate the possibility of altruistic conduct a priori to those who acknowledge the nature of the will to consist in "the consent of the mind with the judgment of the understanding, concerning things agreeing among themselves."[1] Since the understanding is able to judge what is 'good' for others, as well as for the agent himself, there is no reason why one cannot act in a purely altruistic way. Just what Cumberland means here will be seen more clearly by referring to what he says[2] regarding Hobbes's contention that we first desire things, and then call them 'good.' Cumberland holds, on the contrary, "that things are first judged to be good, and that they are afterwards desired only so far as they seem good."

This, of course, is all unsatisfactory. From a general statement of the universality of a certain degree of benevolence, we have passed to a bit of more than questionable psychology, used to explain the possibility of altruistic conduct. But Cumberland does not always attempt to rationalize the matter in this way. Somewhat earlier in the treatise,[3] he attempts to show how altruistic feelings would naturally arise and be fostered, not only among men, but also among the higher animals. We may omit as irrelevant the first two considerations urged and pass to the third, which is, that "the motion of the blood and heart, which is necessary to life, is befriended by love, desire, hope, and joy, especially when conversant about a great good." But a good known to extend to the most possible will by that very fact be recognized as the greatest. Hence benevolent affections will conduce to the preservation of man or animal, as the case may be. A fourth argument is "that animals are incited to endeavor the propagation of their own species by the force of the same causes which preserve the life of every individual, so that these two are connected by [a] tie evidently natural."[4] The details of the argument are not particularly convincing. The important point is: Cumberland argues that altruism comes in with sexual love and the parental

  1. See p. 173.
  2. See p. 168.
  3. See p. 122 et seq.
  4. See p. 128.