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EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT.
[Vol. IV.

is contradicted by the flower; in the same way the appearance of the fruit might be taken as proof that the blossom was a false existence. But in point of fact the transient character of these objects makes them elements of an organic unity, in which they are not only not contradictory of one another, but all equally essential constituents in the life of the whole."[1] But the complete self-consciousness, thus attained, is not a unity of sense, imagination, and reason, but only the last term in the development, namely reason; and Hegel contends with vehemence in behalf of reason against the relatively vain pretensions of enthusiasm and feeling. The consequence is that sense and feeling become stranded, while the perfected consciousness is merely spirit as thinking. This consequence draws after it the conclusion that religion and all forms of art, including poetry, are less complete manifestations of consciousness than is philosophy.[2]

Now the principle of evolution, as it took form in the minds of scientists and philosophers subsequent to Hegel, involved and answered to the demand for a new baptism into nature, a new and direct contact with the world, and a new and higher place for emotion. As against the philosophy of self-consciousness, the idea of evolution is the reassertion of the mysterious, and in that way the Unconscious of von Hartmann, the Nature of Darwin, the Unknowable of Mr. Spencer, the Eternal not-ourselves of Matthew Arnold, and the Invisible Hand of Tolstoi, become intelligible. Yet, intelligible though this demand for a reinterpretation of consciousness is, it can be met only by a theory which, while refusing to grant the impossibility of apprehending the ultimate nature of things, gives to feeling and emotion the place which they should occupy. To such a theory I have ventured to give the name, not of evolution, but of development.

It must be frankly conceded to the philosophy of evolution that, if consciousness be made equal to clear thought, much that has gone on in history and in the mind of man, must be

  1. Phänomenologie des Geistes, preface, p. 4.
  2. Wallace, Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, § 572.