difficulty. Without some external things, the individual cannot exist, still less be of any service to his fellow-men. Moreover, "the same nourishment and necessary clothing which preserves the life of one man cannot at the same time perform the same office for any other." Hence, in practice, some of the things essential to the maintenance of life must be divided in order to be used at all. This applies absolutely, however, only to food and clothing. Cumberland certainly has a great deal more than these in mind. Indeed, he shows that in a state of nature, preceding the complete division of things, frequent disputes would arise "where it was not very evident what was necessary for each."[1] These, and also the sloth of those 'neglecting to cultivate the common fields,' would inevitably, he thinks, lead to the further division.
(2) But this division, having once been made, is final, owing to the assumed continuance of 'like times and circumstances.' The too easy transition from (1) to (2) is the weak point in the deduction. Some division had to be made; a certain division has actually been made; and the complete and abiding justice of this division Cumberland accepts as a matter of course. We need not discuss the division, he says, "because we all find it ready made to our hands, in a manner plainly sufficient to procure the best end, the honor of God and the happiness of all men, if they be not wanting to themselves."[2] That there is any way radically to remove the hardships of the present distribution (which certainly is not worse than it was in Cumberland's time), one would perhaps be the last to maintain; but the author's breezy optimism with regard to the felicity resulting from the existing distribution, is a little amusing, in the light of the economic problems of the present day. The choice, according to his view, would seem to be between the present system and "violating and overturning all settled rights, divine and human, and endeavoring to introduce a new division of all property, according to the judgment or affections of [some] one man."[3]
