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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.
[Vol. IV.

must either use such words as 'excess process,' 'habit,' and 'accommodation' in an entirely new sense when we come to speak of the activity of Attention, or we must acknowledge that this activity is not only more but other than the reaction of the organism to stimulation. Organic imitation and Volition are absolutely unlike each other, and they are not made alike by being described in the same terms and with the same formulas. But perhaps it would be better to withhold criticism until the companion volume, containing "Interpretations," shall make its appearance.

F. Tracy.
Philosopliy of Mind. An Essay on the Metaphysics of Psychology. By Georgo Trumbull Ladd, Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.—pp. xiv, 414.

If the reviewer's sole function were to be critical, he would find his task a difficult one when dealing with this latest work by Professor Ladd. Instead of having the author at his mercy (as he might have fondly hoped), an examination of the book would soon convince him that that skillful book-maker has entrenched himself so strongly between his well-known psychological treatises and a yet unborn work on general philosophy, as to completely deprive the reviewer of his usual point of vantage. For Professor Ladd constantly appeals for a statement of the facts and laws of Mind to the authority of his books on psychology, and especially to the Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory. Those who are acquainted with the results of the learned author's extensive labors in this field will not feel inclined to dispute his statement that the right to speculate "has been earned by careful study of the mental phenomena from all possible points of view" (p. 82). On the other hand, again, the reviewer must keep in mind the author's warning that the conclusions of the present work are only provisional. These conclusions apply, one may say, only sub specie individualitatis, and will all have to be reconsidered and revised " in the supreme court of general philosophy" (pp. 294, 410 et passim).

The table of contents and general standpoint of the book have already been indicated in a brief notice which appeared in the March issue of this Review (Vol. IV, p. 230). The author's purpose, as was there stated, is to discuss more in detail than was found possible in his psychological treatises some of the metaphysical questions suggested by these earlier inquiries. The main discussions